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Cultural Factors and Ethical Integrity
BY JESSICA VAPNEK*
The UC Hastings Ethical Integrity Symposium (Professional
Ethical Integrity: Cornerstone for Rule of Law Reform Around the
Globe) was designed around the assumption that a lack of ethical
integrity undermines the rule of law in various countries. Informed
by my travels and work in more than eighty-five countries, my
remarks at the symposium offered some perspectives on why ethical
behavior is so elusive in many environments.
Having lived in Africa (in the Democratic Republic of Congo
and Ghana) for a total of three years, having worked in or travelled to
almost thirty African countries, and currently managing several
projects in Africa, I am particularly familiar with the challenges
facing these cultures, although I suspect the issues raised will be
familiar to those who have lived and worked in other parts of the
developing world. The intention of my remarks is not to use poverty
to justify unethical behavior or corruption, but rather to explain the
cultural context so as to better understand what may be motivating
people to act in ways that we in the developed world would call
unethical.
To address the issue of ethical integrity, these remarks outline
links between law and economic development, list cultural factors
that may contribute to ethical lapses in some developing countries,
and highlight solutions that have been implemented in various parts
of the world.
*B.A. Yale University, J.D. Boalt Hall School of Law, Director of Technical Programs,
Tetra Tech DPK. The views expressed here are the author's alone. The author would like to
thank Peter Boaz, Helga Turku, Jeffrey Collins, and Amir Namini for their assistance with
turning my remarks from the Hastings Ethical Integrity Symposium into this brief essay.
These remarks are dedicated to Paul W. Vapnek (1929-2015), whose devotion to ethics
inspired many at Hastings and around the state.
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I. Law and Economic Development
Extensive research has established a direct causal link between
improvement in the rule of law and economic growth. A strong
system governed by the rule of law reduces risk to investors by
protecting individual property rights and enforcing contracts.
Investors are understandably reluctant to invest in countries with
weak legal institutions, where their assets will not be protected' or
where business disputes may not be resolved fairly. That is why
countries seeking to attract capital investment and grow
economically must first take measures to strengthen the rule of law.
For example, to attract foreign investment, the Government of Benin
aimed to streamline the business registration process and shift
foreign investors' perceptions of doing business in the country. What
formerly took eighteen days and required multiple visits to multiple
agencies now takes one or two days and involves one location, clear
documentary requirements, and standardized fees. Benin's creation
of a one-stop shop for business registration decreased the regulatory
burden, increased transparency, and reduced corruption.2
Economic development also requires a well-functioning judicial
system. Adam Smith observed that a factor that "greatly retarded
commerce was the imperfection of the law and the uncertainty in its
application." 3 Following this logic, Macedonia, hoping to join the
European Union (EU) and NATO, reformed its justice sector to
comply with the Copenhagen EU accession criteria of "stable and
well-functioning state institutions as a guarantor for democracy, rule
of law, and the protection of human rights and minority rights."
The absence of a well-functioning judicial system facilitates
chronic corruption, which has a severe impact on economic growth,
foreign and domestic investment, private savings, and political
1. Urkaly Isayev, Director, Kyrg. Rep. Foreign Inv. Agency, Foreign Investment
During the Transition: How to Attract It, and How to Make the Best Use of It, Address
Before International Conference on Problems of Managing Economies in Transition and
Prospects for Economic Growth (May 27, 1998) available at https://www.imf.org/external
/np/eu2/kyrgyz/pdf/isayev.pdf.
2. The World Bank's 2015 Doing Business Report gives Benin a ranking of 117 in the
"Starting a Business" category, a significant improvement over its ranking of 139 in 2014
and 157 in 2011.
3. ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 528 (R. L. Meek et al. eds. 1978).
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stability.' Because an effective judicial system requires ethical
behavior by justice sector actors, judicial integrity is thus essential to
economic development.5 Proper functioning of the judiciary means
citizens can expect the law to be followed by government officials,
which in turn creates predictability, foreseeability, and stability. All
are preconditions for investment and, ultimately, economic growth.
Judicial integrity serves the equally important social goal of
maintaining "public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary,
which is essential to the effectiveness of the court system."6 Ethical
behavior by the judiciary contributes to citizens' perceptions that
justice is being served in general and in individual cases. By contrast,
and not surprisingly, corruption within the judiciary has strong,
negative effects on citizens' perceptions of justice and social
equality.
In short, when "all persons, institutions and entities, public and
private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are
publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently
adjudicated,"' investors will feel safe to invest their capital, which
fuels economic growth. A more accountable judiciary leads to more
transparency, more predictability, and less opportunity for
corruption, which in turn promotes economic development and
stability. Citizens gain greater confidence in the legal system and in
the government in general.
II. Corruption
Corruption, defined as "the abuse of public position for private
gain," is widely acknowledged as a significant and extensive
problem with multiple harmful effects. In many countries, corruption
exists in all forms, from small payoffs to high-level corruption. Petty
corruption might consist of an inspector accepting a gift of the
products or produce being inspected in return for not finding code
4. Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. Econ. 681 (1995).
5. E.S.C. Res. 2006/23, U.N. Doc. E/RES/2006/23 (July 27, 2006) (stating that state
members are convinced that integrity, independence, and impartiality of the judiciary are
essential prerequisites for the effective protection of human rights and economic
development).
6. Provincial Court Judges Ass'n v. Manitoba, [1997] S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
7. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Traditional Justice in Conflict and
Post-Conflict Societies, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004).
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violations, or a police officer soliciting a cash payment in return for
not issuing a traffic ticket. Government officials might demand or
extort payments from citizens to provide basic services like
electricity or to process documents and forms, even for services that
are supposed to be free. Large-scale corruption might consist of large
payoffs that alter government policies to funnel resources into illicit
industries, such as the drug trade.
A variety of conditions enable both petty and large-scale
corruption. Petty corruption, sometimes called administrative
corruption, is facilitated by excessively complicated procedures for
the delivery of government services, insufficiently trained and
underpaid government workers, and inadequate oversight and audit
mechanisms. Large-scale corruption can, paradoxically, be facilitated
by large amounts of licit development money entering a country as
well as by illicit industries such as the drug trade. Both can lead
public officials to abuse their power and demand improper payments
from private citizens, corporations, or both.
III. Cultural Factors
Although extensive research shows corruption is detrimental to
economic growth, it is widespread in much of the developing world.
The following discussion of cultural factors is based on my
observations gathered over years of working and traveling in Africa
and elsewhere.
A. Poverty
In a wealthy country like the United States, people take many of
their advantages for granted. Residents of developed countries can
hardly imagine the kind of poverty people experience elsewhere in
the world. Over 14% of the world's population makes only $1.25 per
day; in sub-Saharan Africa, the situation is even more dire, with
more than 46% of the population making that amount. Other factors,
such as lack of education, perpetuate the poverty cycle. According to
UNESCO, 8 only 36% of youth aged fifteen to twenty-four in Niger
are literate, and only 49% in Burkina Faso. Not surprisingly, 41% of
8. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.
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Nigerians and 44% of Burkinab6s make $1.25 or less per day.
These numbers obscure what living on $1.25 per day really
means. People living in sub-Saharan Africa may have plastic shoes
or no shoes at all; they may not have access to clean drinking water
or sanitation; they probably have to walk and work in the hot sun;
they may have one change of clothes that they wash by hand in a
bucket or a stream. Children likely work alongside their mother in
the field or, if they are daughters, stay home to care for their younger
siblings, foregoing school because their parents need help in the
home or in the fields or cannot afford school fees. Girls' burden to
care for younger siblings, carry water, and prepare food is
particularly great,' despite a clear link between higher educational
levels for females and economic growth.
Even members of the middle class in poor countries, although
not living in extreme poverty, simply do not have the resources
enjoyed by people in developed countries. They have trouble making
ends meet, which can increase the temptation to push ethical
boundaries. For example, law professors in the United States may
occasionally engage in outside consulting to gain experience, make
contacts, stay busy, contribute to knowledge, or earn a little more
money. Law professors in a poor country earning $800 per month
have to do a lot more than occasional consulting to stay afloat, like
taking on many clients and multiple consultancies. They may have
to cut corners because of the need to juggle many projects at once.
Perhaps they spend less time preparing for lectures, or they recycle a
consultancy report paid for by one donor and use it again for a
different donor. They might even hire a student to write the first draft
of a consultancy report because they cannot afford - literally - to
turn down paid work. It becomes a slippery ethical slope.
B. Tight-Knit Society
In many developing countries, social contacts are paramount.
There are very few elder care homes and almost no orphanages
because people care for their immediate and distant family members.
In fact, in many African languages there is no word for "uncle,"
"aunt," or "cousin"; one simply addresses these relatives as "mother,"
9. WORLD BANK, Girls' Education, (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.worldbank.org/en/top
ic/education/brief/girls-education.
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"father," "brother," "sister." In sub-Saharan Africa, the family system
continues to be the central social welfare mechanism.'o Less well-off
parents may send one or more of their children to live with, be raised
by, and be educated by wealthier relatives. An adult with little income
may live in his or her sibling's house, bringing along spouse and
children. Because a law professor earning $800 per month is doing
far better than many of his relatives in the village, she/he will
probably have half a dozen or a dozen people to support, or more.
Thus, the $800 monthly salary does not just support professor and
nuclear family; it must stretch to support relatives living back home
in the village as well as all the people living in the professor's
household."
Familial obligations do not end with one's immediate family;
they extend to one's clan and ethnic group. In a context where
family and ethnicity come first, the societal rules are such that one
powerful individual - a judge for instance - may feel obligated to
hire a relative for a vacant staff position and will be expected to
favor any familial or ethnic relation in a litigation.
It is easy to see how American cultural expectations for ethical
behavior may run counter to those of other cultures. In our society, a
public official who hires a cousin outside of a meritocratic selection
process has violated ethical rules; in many societies around the
world, a public official who does not hire a cousin when the
opportunity arises has violated the unwritten, accepted ethical rules
that hold the society together. 12
C. Lack of Stability
Because many countries lack a tradition of stable politics, even
employed people never know how long they will keep their
positions. This can lead them to feel the need to maximize every
possible advantage. At its most extreme, this phenomenon explains
10. Africa's Orphaned Generations, UNICEF (Nov., 2003), http://www.unicef.org/sow
c06/pdfs/africasorphans.pdf.
11. When I was in the Peace Corps in the former Zaire from 1985 to 1987, the one
doctor in the next town had 18 adults living in his house.
12. And lest we think this is solely an issue in developing countries, readers may
remember California under Governor George Deukmejian when the appointments of
Armenian Americans increased: at one point there were two Armenian Americans on
California's seven-justice Supreme Court.
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"kleptocratic" governments like that of Mobutu Sese Seko in the
former Zaire. But even on a smaller scale, research shows that
perceived job insecurity and a perceived lack of stability significantly
affect employees' temptation to engage in fraud." The desire for
undue gain through unethical behavior may not be as extreme for
these low-level employees, but the same motivations persist. Where
there is the ever-present possibility that an employee may lose his or
her position and start living hand-to-mouth, there is a significant
temptation to gain as much benefit as possible during what may be a
transient period of employment.
D. Scarce Resources Lead to Hoarding
Where there is not enough power or resources to go around,
"turf-defending" behavior results. In such circumstances, it is hard to
call people to a higher motivation - like ethics or the importance of the
rule of law - when they are simply thinking of feeding themselves.
For example, in countries with low levels of economic and social
development, most inhabitants are extremely poor and lack basic
information about their legal rights and how to exercise them. Some
court staff exploit the population's ignorance of court processes and
fees by charging litigants 'fees' that are substantially different from
what is mandated. The government clerks' salaries may be only $100
or $200 per month, so they feel they must generate additional income
for survival by charging unauthorized fees. These practices can
generate resistance to measures that would otherwise be regarded as
improvements. For instance, when my company's1 4 USAID-funded
project in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) helped
courthouses install glass-encased bulletin boards listing legally
mandated fees, some court staff resisted because they perceived the
bulletins as a threat to their livelihood, and the glass cases were
vandalized more than once - we assumed by the court staff.
Defensive behavior can occur in other contexts. In one example I
witnessed, a donor was supporting a country's attempt to rationalize
13. Owolabi A. Benjamin & Babalola S. Samson, Effect of Perceived Inequality and
Perceived Job Insecurity on Fraudulent Intent of Bank Employees in Nigeria, 7 EUR. J.
PSYCHOL. 99 (2011) (Nigeria, where this study was conducted, ranked 136 out of 175
countries on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index).
14. I.e. implemented by Tetra Tech DPK.
2016] 129
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
its regulatory system for packaged water to reduce the burden on
packaged water producers. Producers faced three different inspection
regimes involving different ministries and agencies, each with its
own forms, inspections, and fees. In addition to streamlining the
system of overlapping and burdensome inspections that were
impeding economic development, another of the government's
objectives was to reduce opportunities for corruption.
I observed that the various entities regulating aspects of
packaged water production were actively or passively resisting the
call to improve the system, despite the clear benefits to human
health, the environment, and exports that would result. Their
opposition and resistance were explicable only if they were thinking
of the income (fees and bribes) they were collecting from
inspections. They may also have anticipated that if their unit's
mandate were reduced due to the streamlining of the regulatory and
inspection regime, then they would have less power, and then their
unit might be eliminated, and then they might be out of a job. In an
environment where government employees may be supporting 18
adults and as many or more children's school fees, they cannot be
expected to think of the "greater good" of reducing corruption,
advancing public health, or reducing environmental waste. Rather,
they are likely thinking about how to make ends meet.
IV. Solutions
So is the prognosis bleak, then, when we consider whether
donor-funded rule-of-law projects can successfully tackle corruption
and promote ethical integrity in poorer countries? Can a push to
improve the rule of law overcome the countervailing cultural factors
just reviewed? The next section outlines some solutions that my
colleagues and I have helped implement - usually with United States
tax dollars through the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) - to increase accountability and strengthen
the rule of law.
A. Improving Access to Information and Education
The example above notwithstanding, educating the public about
correct judicial fees is one effective way to tackle corruption; it
eliminates petty extortion by court officials. Bulletin boards alone
may not be sufficient, as the example in the DRC suggests. My
130 [Vol. 39:1
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company's projects have installed information booths in courts
staffed with volunteers (Cte d'Ivoire), produced and aired anti-
corruption programs on radio and television (Afghanistan),
implemented public awareness activities in poor neighborhoods
(Haiti), improved court websites to disseminate information to the
public (Jordan), used local non-profit organizations to implement
children's art and drama contests with rule-of-law themes (West
Bank), and engaged local organizations to run mobile clinics to
provide free legal education and assistance to vulnerable populations
such as widows, the disabled, and the internally displaced (Iraq). All
of these improve access to information on the theory that an
informed population is less likely to be faced with a demand for an
improper payment and more likely to take a stand against it when it
occurs. Especially where the cultural context calls for what we
would call favoritism or nepotism, these types of public information
activities are essential.
B. Increasing Transparency
A judicial decision is the end result after interventions by several
judicial actors. Without proper information transparency, individual
judicial actors who accept bribes can exercise undue control over an
accused person's case or the amount of time spent in jail. Less overt
but just as insidious, an accused person can languish in prison because
judicial actors lack resources to track when, for example, the accused
was supposed to see a magistrate or even be released from jail. Our
Haiti project helped put in place a pilot electronic case management
system to increase transparency and reduce opportunities for improper
influence in judicial case files. Similarly, our project in Jordan helped
automate all of the courts in the kingdom with the same objective.
Where there are fewer paper files that can be intentionally "lost" by
someone who has received a bribe, where court users have ready
access to information about the progress of their case files, and where
tickler systems remind judicial actors of deadlines, this reduces the
ability of judicial actors to behave unethically or for improper reasons
(e.g., family ties). It also makes the justice system more effective and
improves the rule of law.
2016] 131
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C. Improving Coordination Among Actors in the Criminal Chain
Even a well-functioning court with well-trained magistrates will
still be hamstrung if the prosecutor's office does not operate well or
if cases are insufficiently investigated and prepared by the police.
Several of our projects have implemented joint training of police and
prosecutors to improve coordination and to increase the numbers of
eyes on each case. Even in a country with a paper-based case file
system, the more people following a case the less ability any one
person has to improperly act (or not act) with respect to that case
when offered a bribe or because of a personal connection to a
defendant or a detainee. Improved coordination provides better, more
transparent, and more unbiased judicial service to the population and
in turn improves public perceptions of the courts and the
government.
D. Using Legislation to Control the Criminal Process
New or amended legislation can improve transparency and
accountability. Benin enacted changes to its criminal procedure code,
limiting the number of postponements in court cases and imposing
strict limits on allowable time intervals between steps in the criminal
process. Now, a richer litigant cannot indefinitely postpone a case
by paying a judge to keep postponing the case. Guatemala shortened
allowable times for pretrial detention for the same reason (as well as
for human rights concerns). Macedonia and Jordan adopted a system
of random case assignments to judges to reduce possibilities for
corruption or undue influence/interference. Legal changes at the
Parliamentary level can take time, but if the reforms are shepherded
well, they can generate public consensus and effect real change. The
new time limits in Benin, for example, because they are coupled with
strong individual rights under the Constitution, have transformed
criminal justice practices in the country, reduced opportunities for
corruption, and improved public perceptions of the justice system.
E. Prosecuting High Profile Corruption Cases
A few strategic prosecutions of high-level government
corruption cases can significantly affect public perceptions of the
justice system and can have a chilling effect on corruption. Training
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prosecutors to support investigation and prosecution of high-profile
cases (Philippines) and implementing a certificate program in
anticorruption (Peru) are two recent strategies implemented in our
projects with the goal of not only going after corrupt public figures,
but also raising public awareness of corruption issues and
galvanizing interest in the government's anticorruption agenda.
F. Adopting Merit-Based Selection Procedures for Judges
In many countries, appointment of judges is rife with nepotism
and favoritism, which negatively affects the administration of justice
and public perceptions of the justice system. It also perpetuates
undue attention to family and clan ties. In some circumstances, the
executive has an undue role in the appointments process (and one not
balanced by inputs from the legislative branch, as in the U.S. federal
system), undermining the independence of the judiciary. To improve
the system, our projects in the DRC and Jordan helped implement
more transparent career paths for magistrates. The first step was to
collect information through surveys on the careers of all the
magistrates in the country; the next was to develop and apply more
transparent and merit-based selection criteria. In Jordan, the numbers
of women and minorities in the judiciary increased dramatically with
the new merit-based system. In the DRC, the High Judicial Council
now has a clear picture of vacancies, promotions, transfers, and
impending retirements, and the number of women in the judiciary has
also increased. The expectation is that where there is less cronyism in
appointments there is fairer adjudication and more respect for the
judicial system and, by extension, the rule of law.
G. Improving Magistrates' Capacities, Performance, and Ethics
In some countries, magistrates and court staff do not know the
applicable ethical rules and disciplinary procedures. According to the
logic that even in poor countries the unethical behavior of some
justice sector actors is due to ignorance and not to intentional
malfeasance, our projects have supported the drafting of codes of
ethics and professional conduct for magistrates (DRC, Macedonia,
C~te d'Ivoire), established clear criteria for sanction and dismissal of
magistrates (which also prevents arbitrary dismissals and
interference by the executive) (DRC), and financially supported
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judicial inspections of courts and detention centers (DRC, Haiti).
Even beyond the realm of ethics, in many countries magistrates
receive little continuing training and may not have access to legal
resources. To improve judicial performance, countries take a variety
of steps. Our projects have strengthened central judicial training
institutes (Jordan, Cte d'Ivoire), trained magistrates (Cte d'Ivoire,
Haiti, DRC), and prepared and distributed compendia of criminal
laws and civil codes (DRC). In Afghanistan, our project helped
formulate guidance documents for anticorruption tribunal judges to
help them select appropriate sentencing ranges for particular crimes.
This both reduced their scope for discretion and improved how they
were doing their jobs. The objectives of these interventions are not
only to build judges' capacity to make better decisions and reduce
opportunities for improper influence, but also to improve the overall
functioning of courts and burnish the reputation of the judiciary.
V. Conclusion
Many questions remain unanswered. Once we understand the
cultural factors that might induce civil servants in a justice system to
behave unethically, what do we do with that insight? Do we excuse
them? Do we construct systems to minimize the temptations or block
opportunities for corruption? Do we introduce more checks and
balances? Do we educate them about behaviors they may not realize
are unethical? Does it instead depend on getting those seventeen
other adults and twenty-six kids off their coattails, and is that a rule-
of-law issue? The defaced posters are a telling case. In that instance,
our project accepted we could not change the court staff's desire to
obstruct change and continue to demand "fees" from court users, but
instead made it impossible for the unethical people to succeed, through
other means. I would urge readers interested in these issues to think
back to the examples I gave of culturally conditioned unethical
behavior, identify whether the solutions being implemented are
effective, and if they are not, propose others.'
15. "From my home so close to the Silicon Valley, I can't resist saying that I wish
some of the brilliance and resources currently being devoted to developing apps to help
people find the nearest bar or sexual partner, or design the most realistic murderous game,
could instead be channeled toward solving some of these sorts of problems - which are
critical to our shared humanity and shared future."
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To me, the most difficult cases are those where otherwise ethical
people are forced by expectations or circumstances to push
boundaries or cross lines that even they recognize. The answer may
be as simple as economic development. If salaries were raised, I
believe some corruption would lessen or disappear. Although there is
certainly corruption in rich countries (see, e.g., Rod Blagojevich), I
like to believe that the combination of higher standards of living and
a stronger likelihood of getting caught and punished (because of a
well-functioning justice system) keeps corruption levels lower. This
solution can work even where temptations due to cultural factors or
extreme poverty are high indeed.
Some readers may wish for more proof of the effectiveness of
these solutions, and in that case they are in good company with the
increasing numbers of donors and critics clamoring that everything
be measured (as if improvements in the rule of law could be
measured like vaccinations or agricultural exports). It is beyond the
scope of these remarks to prove or disprove whether international
development assistance works. Despite book-length arguments by
the likes of Rachel Kleinfeld and Thomas Carothers, my own feeling
is that when faced with fuzzy, complex subjects like the
improvement of the rule of law, the reduction of corruption, and the
improvement of ethical integrity, it comes down to a matter of faith.
You either believe it works or you do not. From the vantage point of
having worked in international development in some form for almost
thirty years, my view is that the solutions presented here really do
work - especially when they are carefully designed to take into
account the particular cultural contexts and the real motivations and
circumstances facing justice sector actors and the public at large.
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